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ABSTRACT 
Every company has the same goal that is to maximize the value of the company and the 
wealth of its shareholders. Due to the different interests between the shareholders and the 
management, there is always conflict in the company. Share ownerships by the company 
management is believed to be able to unite the interest between the shareholders and the 
manager, therefore at the end, it results in the company performance in achieving company 
goals. Funding decision is a structure that has to be implemented by the management cor-
rectly so that the value of the company can increase. This research uses 130 manufacture 
companies that listed on Indonesian Stock Exchange by the year of 2010. The method to 
choose the samples is done by using purposive sampling method and path analysis method. 
The result of this research show that: 1) managerial ownership effect directly the company 
value, 2) funding decision does not affect the company value, 3) managerial ownership effect 
the company value with funding decision as its intervening variable and it is approved that 
funding decision is used to find the effect of managerial ownership on the company value. 
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PENGARUH KEPEMILIKAN MANAJERIAL TERHADAP NILAI  
PERUSAHAAN DENGAN KEPUTUSAN PENDANAAN  
SEBAGAI VARIABEL INTERVENING 
ABSTRAK 
Setiap perusahaan memiliki tujuan yang sama yaitu untuk memaksimalkan nilai perusahaan dan 
kekayaan pemegang saham. Karena ada perbedaan kepentingan antara pemegang saham dan 
manajemen, selalu ada juga konflik di perusahaan. Kepemilikan saham oleh manajemen perusa-
haan diyakini mampu menyatukan kepentingan antara pemegang saham dan manajer, karena itu 
pada akhirnya, meningkatkan kinerja perusahaan dalam mencapai tujuan perusahaan. Kepu-
tusan pendanaan adalah struktur yang harus dilaksanakan oleh manajemen dengan benar se-
hingga nilai perusahaan dapat meningkat. Penelitian ini menggunakan 130 perusahaan manu-
faktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia pada tahun 2010. Metode untuk memilih sampel 
dilakukan dengan menggunakan metode purposive sampling dan metode analisis jalur. Hasil 
penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa: 1) kepemilikan manajerial berpengaruh secara langsung 
terhadap nilai perusahaan, 2) keputusan pendanaan tidak berpengaruh terhadap nilai perusa-
haan, 3) kepemilikan manajerial berpengaruh terhadap nilai perusahaan dengan keputusan pen-
danaan sebagai variabel intervening yang dan membuktikan bahwa keputusan pendanaan 
digunakan untuk mengetahui pengaruh kepemilikan manajerial terhadap nilai perusahaan. 
 
Kata Kunci: Kepemilikan Manajerial, Keputusan Pendanaan, Nilai Perusahaan. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The firms, in general, have the same objec-
tive that is maximizing their value or the 
shareholder wealth. The higher the value of 
the common stock owned the higher wealth 
that they obtained. In this case, the value of 
the firm is reflected by the price per share 
that the stock is a reflection of financial 
management decision. The value of the firm 
is measured by price book value (PBV) be-
cause the ratio measures the value that is 
given by the financial market to the man-
agement and the firm’s organization as the 
sustainable developed company (Untung and 
Hartini 2006). 
The market price of the stock is one as-
pect to measure the value of the firm be-
cause it can reflect the valuation of the all 
investor having the equities. An increase of 
the firm’s value can be achieved if there is 
cooperation between the company’s man-
agement and other parties like the share-
holder or stakeholder. There will be no prob-
lem between the management and the other 
parties if their actions are the same. The re-
searchers believe that the ownership struc-
ture can affect the operation of the firm that 
finally influences the company’s perform-
ance in reaching its objective. It is caused by 
their controls. 
The managerial ownership is the posses-
sion of stock or company of the influential 
parties in making decisions like board of 
commissioners, board of directors, and man-
agement. Faizal (2005) explained that the 
managerial ownership can assist the unifica-
tion of the interests of the owners and the 
management. The higher the proportion of 
the managerial ownership is, the better the 
company’s performance is. The increasing 
of the managerial ownership will be parallel 
or equal the management position with the 
shareholder so the management will be mo-
tivated to increase the company’s perform-
ance. 
The financing decision is a policy of 
how an asset or an investment can be fi-
nanced, how much the fund is demanded 
and where the source of the fund is ob-
tained so that it can be attained by the 
combination of the optimal use of the fund 
sources. In doing so, the financial manager 
should establish the accurate financial 
structure to improve the value of the firm. 
Wahidawati (2002) said that the stock’s 
ownership of the management is nega-
tively correlated with the using of the debt 
while institutional ownership significantly 
is affected and negatively correlated with 
debt ratio.  
Untung and Hartini (2006) found from 
the research result that the managerial 
ownership affected the financing decision 
and the institutional ownership didn’t in-
fluence the financial decision including the 
financing decision. The study of Diyah and 
Erman (2009) obtained the research result 
that the managerial ownership didn’t affect 
toward the financing decision and the insti-
tutional ownership also didn’t significantly 
influence the financing decision. The study 
of Yulius and Josua (2007) explained that 
most of the financing resource of the com-
panies is derived from creditors. The com-
pany without the managerial ownership is 
risky to take the debt policy as its financ-
ing resource. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESIS 
The Managerial Ownership 
The managerial ownership is a part of the 
company ownership structure. According to 
Ituriaga and Zanz (1998) in Faizal (2005) 
the ownership can be distinguished from two 
different perspectives: 
The agency approach: The ownership struc-
ture is a mechanism to reduce the conflict of 
interest between the management and the 
shareholders. 
The asymmetry information approach: The 
ownership structure is one way to reduce the 
information imbalance between internal and 
external parts through the information dis-
closure. 
The definition of ownership structure is 
described to picture the important variables 
in the capital structure that it not only af-
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fected by the amount of debt and equity but 
also influenced by the percentage of the 
managerial and institutional ownership. 
 
The Financing Decision 
A debt financing or financial leverage has 
three important implications (Brigham 2001: 
84): 
A debt financing enables the shareholders to 
control the company with a limited invest-
ment. 
The creditors noticed that the equity or the 
fund deposited by the shareholders will pro-
vide the safety margin so that so the share-
holders only give a small part of a total fi-
nancing then the bigger company risk is bore 
by the creditors. 
If the company obtains a bigger return of the 
investment financed by debt and compared 
with the interest payment, the repayment of 
the owner’s capital will be higher, or “lever-
aged”. 
Moelyadi (2006) in Diyah and Eman 
(2009) explained that the raising of fund 
was interesting because every fund is used 
absolutely had a cost of fund. If the com-
pany uses the fund from the debt the com-
pany should pay the amount of the cost as 
big as the interest rate. But, if the company 
is financed by equity capital it should con-
sider the opportunity cost of that equity 
capital. 
The company needs to consider how the 
combination of the capital resource is used 
and from where the capital will be gained. 
Therefore, the financing policy is a policy 
which deals with the fund resource used to 
finance an investment associated with the 
optimal combination of using any fund re-
sources. 
Mulyadi (2006) in (Diyah and Erman 
2009), argued that the financing decision 
will be associated with the determination of 
the combination of any fund resources that is 
basically divided in two parts: 1) External 
financing leading to the decision making 
about the capital structure determining the 
proportion of the long term debt and the eq-
uity capital. It is clear in the debt to equity 
ratio of the company. 2) Internal financing 
applied accordance with the determination 
of the dividend policy pictured by the divi-
dend payout ratio. 
A good capital structure minimally has 
the proportional internal and external financ-
ing that will pay off the all obligation. 
 
The Value of the Firm 
Agus Sartono (2001: 7) states that the 
main objective of the firm is to maximize 
the profit. The opinion is removed because 
there are many weaknesses of the argu-
ment. The weaknesses include such as 1) 
the micro economic standard with the 
profit maximization is static because it 
doesn’t consider the time dimension so 
there is no the difference between the short 
time profit and the long time profit; 2) the 
definition of profit is to maximize the 
nominal amount of profit or the level of 
profit; 3) according to the risk of every 
alternative of the decision maximizing the 
profit without considering the risk in the 
future is a fatal error; 4) maximizing the 
profit can be performed by saving the re-
sult of selling the stocks in the time de-
posit, but in this case the shareholders will 
request the higher level of the return of the 
time deposit for the bigger risk then the 
stock price will decrease and also will 
lowering the value of the firm. 
Based on the weaknesses of the defini-
tion above, the firm is changed to maxi-
mize the firms’ objective by the increasing 
the shareholders wealth. Since the share-
holders wealth can increase, the stock 
price of the firm can grow as well. The 
value of the firm is determined by the 
stock market. The value of the firm that 
doesn’t sell the stock in the stock market 
also is affected by the same stock market 
(Agus Sartono 2001: 8). 
There are quantitative used to estimate 
the value of the firm such as (1) the book 
value. The book value is the amount of the 
asset in the balance sheet reduced by the 
liabilities or the equity capital; (2) the mar-
ket value of the firm. The market value of 
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the firm is an approach to estimate the net 
value of the business; (3) the appraisal 
value. The company using the independent 
appraisal value will allow a reduction of 
the goodwill if the company asset price 
increases; (4) the expected cash flow 
value. This value is used in the valuation 
of the merger and the acquisition. The pre-
sent value of the cash flow will be maxi-
mal and should be paid by the targeted 
company. The early payment can be re-
duced to calculate the present net value of 
the merger. 
 
The Correlation of the Managerial Own-
ership and the Financing Decision 
The financing decision can be affected by a 
managerial ownership and an institutional 
ownership. It means that the fund is obtained 
from debt or from the internal of the firm. If 
the financing is gained from debt, the ratio 
of debt to equity will increase and finally 
will raise the company risk. 
Taswan (2003) explained the research 
result that the variable of the managerial 
ownership has significantly positive correla-
tion with the debt policy. It means the higher 
the managerial ownership the bigger the 
debt. It happens because the big control of 
the managerial ownership will cause the 
company able to make a better investment 
needing an addition of fund sourcing from 
the debt. 
The demand hypothesis explained that 
the company dominated by insider will use 
the big debt to finance the company activity. 
With the big ownership, the insider can 
maintain the effective control of the com-
pany. The supply hypothesis described that 
the company controlled by the management 
has a small debt agency cost enhancing the 
debt using (Untung and Hartini 2006). 
Wahidahwati (2002) didn’t find the cor-
relation between the managerial ownership 
and the dividend. The correlation explains 
if the management has a big share its asset 
will be well diversified. Thus, the manage-
ment expects a return of the bigger oppor-
tunity cost from a high dividend distribu-
tion. 
The increase of the managerial owner-
ship makes a high attachment of the private 
management asset with the company asset. 
Because of that the management tries to 
reduce the risk of the loss the asset by de-
creasing the leverage level. If the percent-
age of the managerial ownership is high the 
management will reduce the debt role as a 
part of reducing agency cost through its role 
as the decision maker in the financing deci-
sion. 
 
The Correlation between the Managerial 
Ownership and the Value of the Firm 
The agency theory explained the conflict 
between the shareholders and the man-
agement. The managerial ownership as-
sumed that the control mechanism is an 
accurate tool to reduce the conflict. The 
managerial ownership can synchronize the 
interest of the ownership and the manage-
ment. So, the bigger insider ownership the 
higher the value of the firm (Dyah and 
Erman 2009). 
Pound (1998) in (Diyah and Erman 
2009) described the three alternative hy-
potheses against the relationship of the 
managerial ownership and the value of the 
firm. 
The first hypothesis is the efficient 
monitoring hypothesis. This hypothesis 
explains that the individual investor or the 
insider with a small ownership (minority) 
had a tendency to exploit or borrow a vot-
ing power owned by a majority share-
holder to control the management per-
formance. In this case the majority institu-
tional investor will incline to the interest 
of the minority shareholder because they 
have the same interests especially in eco-
nomic incentives (dividend – long term 
interest or stock abnormal return – short 
term interest). The action has an impact on 
the increase of the value of the firm which 
is reflected by raising the stock price in the 
capital market. 
The second hypothesis is the strategic 
alignment hypothesis. The hypothesis says 
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that the institutional investor has a ten-
dency to compromise or incline to the 
management and ignore the minority 
shareholder interest. The assumption that 
the management frequently takes a subop-
timal action or policy and lead to a self 
interest will cause the strategic alliance 
between the majority institutional investor 
and the management is negatively re-
sponded by the market. It will impact a 
decreasing of the company price share in 
the capital market. 
The third hypothesis is the conflict of in-
terest hypothesis. Basically this hypothesis 
has a same concept with the second hy-
pothesis. That is a tendency of the majority 
institutional investor to compromise and to 
alliance with the management. 
 
The Correlation between the Financing 
Decisions toward the Value of the Firm 
Agus Sartono (2001: 8) said the value of the 
firm is a form to maximize the value of the 
firm through maximization wealth of stock-
holders. The value of the public companies 
is determined by a capital market. The value 
of the company that doesn’t trade the share 
in the capital market is also affected by the 
same capital market. 
The company value formed by the indi-
cator of stock market value is affected by the 
investment opportunities. The opportunities 
provide a positive signal about the future 
company development that will increase the 
stock price as an indicator of the company 
value – signaling theory (Untung and Hartini 
2006). 
One of the important decisions that 
should be taken by the management is a 
decision about the capital structure or the 
company financing. This decision corre-
lates with how the composition of the 
company financing uses internal and ex-
ternal funding that influences the value of 
the firm. If the internal fund isn’t enough, 
the company will take the external fund, in 
which one of these is debt. This fund using 
the debt can reduce the taxable income that 
will provide a benefit for the shareholders. 
The studies of Diyah and Erman (2009), 
and Untung and Hartini (2006) stated that 
the financing decision influences the com-
pany value. 
The theoretical framework of the study 
can be shown in Figure 1. Based on the theory 
and the framework of the thought, the research 
hypothesis is formulated as followed: 
H1 : The managerial ownership affects the 
financing decision. 
H2 : The managerial ownership affects the 
value of the firm with the financing decision 
as an intervening variable. 
Figure 1 
Theoretical Framework 
 
         β2 
 
 
 
 
        β1     β3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Managerial 
Ownership (X1) 
Financing Decision 
(X2) 
Value of 
The firm (Y) 
e1 
e2 
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RESEARCH METHOD 
Operational Definition and Variable 
Measurement 
The Value of the Firm 
The value of the firm is measured by the level 
of Market Value Added or Price Book Value 
(PBV), which is a comparison between the 
market price per share and the book value per 
share. The formulation used is: 
erShareBookValuep
eperShareMarketPric=PBV . (1) 
 
The Managerial Ownership 
The managerial ownership is the proportion 
of shares owned by a part that is actively 
involved in company decision making as 
board of directors and board of commission-
ers. The formulation used is: 
butedaresDistriNumberofSh
aresOwnedNumberofSh=MNJR . (2) 
 
The Financing Decision 
The financing decision is measured by com-
parison the company total of debt with the 
total equity. This ration is measured by a 
formulation as follows: 
TotalAsset
TotalDebtBDE = . (3) 
 
The Population, Sample, and Sampling 
Technique 
The population used in the study is manu-
facturing companies that trade their share 
in Indonesia Stock Exchange (ISX) from 
2009 until 2011. The sampling technique 
used the purposive sampling. It takes 
samples using special criteria’s deter-
mined fit with the research objective 
(Uma Sekaran 1992: 237). The criteria’s 
are: (1) the manufacturing companies that 
trade the shares in ISX except the compa-
nies owned by the government of Repub-
lic Indonesia. The companies should have 
the complete data that can support the 
study as the proportion of the company 
shareholders, reporting the financial re-
port and its notes obtained in ISX or 
ICMD; (2) the company had a positive 
equity value and net profit, because the 
negative value will create mathematically 
error and doesn’t have the economic value 
that it is means cannot be interpreted; (3) 
The period of the financial report is 2009 
(the managerial ownership); 2010 (the 
financing decision and the value of the 
firm) 2011 (the value of the firm). 
Based on the criteria’s the research sam-
ples are one hundred and thirty (130) manu-
facturing companies of one hundred and 
forty-eight (148) manufacturing companies 
registered in ISX. 
 
Data Analysis Technique 
In this analysis, the researcher descriptively 
describes each variable in the study. These 
are the managerial ownership (X1), the fi-
nancing decision (X2), and the value of the 
firm (X3). 
 
Hypothesis Test 
The step of hypothesis testing is: 
1. Data Screening and Data Transforma-
tion 
Before testing the assumption, the regres-
sion or the correlation of the variables, the 
first step to screen the normality of the 
data proceeded. The abnormal distributed 
data can be transformed as square root 
(SQRT).  
2. Testing the Assumption of Path Analy-
sis 
The normality test purposes to test if the re-
gression model, the residual has normal dis-
tribution, because F test and t test assume 
that the residual value follows the normal 
distribution (Imam Ghozali 2011:160).  
Testing the multicollinearity aims to 
test whether the regression model founds 
the correlation between independent vari-
ables (Imam Ghozali 2011:105). After test-
ing the multicollinearity based on tolerance 
value and variance inflation factor (VIF) 
can be concluded that this model doesn’t 
have multicollinearity.  
Testing the heteroscedasticity aims to 
test whether the regression model has ine 
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quality of the residual from one observation 
to other observation (Imam Ghozali 2011: 
139).  
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Data Screening and Data Transformation 
The result of data screening using normal-
ity test is shown in Table 1. From the three 
variables used in this study, the two vari-
ables (the managerial ownership and the 
value of the firm) are not normally distrib-
uted so this needs transforming the data. 
While the financing decision is normally 
distributed, it doesn’t need to transform the 
data. For abnormal distributed data were 
transformed (the managerial ownership 
and the value of the firm) into square root 
(SQRT). 
 
Testing the Assumption of Path Analysis 
The research result indicates that the data 
was not normally distributed, and seven out-
lier data were found. The result of testing the 
normality after determination of data is 
shown in Table 2. 
Testing the multicollinearity based on 
tolerance value and variance inflation factor 
(VIF) can be concluded that this model 
doesn’t have multicollinearity. The result of 
multicollinearity test is shown in Table 3. 
The research result shows that the re-
gression model contains the heteroscedastic-
ity. The result of heteroscedasticity is shown 
in Table 4. 
 
Testing the Hypothesis 
The Influence of Managerial Ownership 
to the Financing Decision 
Equation structure: 
X2 = α + β1X1 + e1. (4) 
The research result as shown in Table 5 
declares that the managerial ownership af-
fects toward the financing decision. It is in 
accordance with the demand hypothesis or 
the supply hypothesis. The increase of the 
managerial ownership is followed by the 
increasing of debt that shows that with the 
big ownership the insider want to maintain 
Table 1 
Data Screening 
 
 Managerial 
Ownership 
Financing 
Decision 
Value of the 
Firm 
Kolmogorov Smirnov Z 
Asymp.Sig. (2-tailed) 
4.590 
0.000 
0.669 
0.762 
3.089 
0.000 
      N=130 
      a. Test distribution is Normal. 
 
Table 2 
Testing the Normality after Determination of Data 
 
 Unstandardized Residual 
N 
Kolmogorov Smirnov Z 
Asymp.Sig. (2-tailed) 
123 
0.995 
0.275 
 
Table 3 
Testing the Multicollinearity 
 
Collinearity Statistics Variables VIF 
The Managerial Ownership  1,000 
The Financing Decision  1,000 
      Source: Data analysis result. 
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the control effectively of the company. 
The influence of the managerial owner-
ship toward the value of the firm with the 
financing decision as the intervening vari-
able is drawn. 
Equation structure: 
Y = α + β2X1 + β3X2 + e2. (5) 
The research result as shown in Table 
6 describes that the managerial ownership 
directly affects the value of the firm and 
through the financing decision as inter-
vening variable. It indicates that the man-
agement is so careful in determining the 
decision because they also need to con-
sider the other interest parties as the insti-
tutional parties. The right decision will 
give a good response in the market fol-
lowed by the increasing of the value of 
the firm. 
CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUG-
GESTION, AND LIMITATIONS 
It can be concluded as follows: 1) The 
managerial ownership directly influences 
the financing decision and the value of the 
firm; 2) The financing decision doesn’t 
influence the value of the firm, but based 
on the calculation of path analysis the fi-
nancing decision is an intervening variable 
of the managerial ownership toward the 
value of the firm; 3) The managerial own-
ership indirectly influences the value of 
the firm with the financing decision as the 
intervening variable. 
This study has limitations among others: 
1) this study uses the managerial ownership 
as an independent variable that might have 
small influence. Thus, it cannot be compared 
with the other factors that can merely influ-
Table 4 
Test of Heteroscedasticity 
 
Unstandardized CoefficientsModel 
B 
t Sig. 
(Constant) .458 6.407 .000
Managerial ownership -.646 -2.198 .030
1 
Financing decision .008 .060 .952
   Source: Data analysis result. 
 
Table 5 
The influence of the Managerial Ownership toward the Financing Decision 
 
Unstandardized CoefficientsModel 
B 
t Sig. 
(Constant) 2.314 12.473 .0001 
SQRTMNJR -4.650 -2.876 .005
   Source: Data analysis result. 
 
Table 6 
The Influence of the Managerial Ownership toward the Value of the Firm with the 
Financing Decision as the Intervening Variable 
 
Unstandardized CoefficientsModel 
B Std. Error 
T Sig. 
(Constant) 1.467 .118 12.408 .000
SQRTMNJR -1.676 .486 -3.451 .001
1 
NP -.116 .207 -.562 .575
  Source: Data analysis result. 
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ence the financing decision and the value of 
the firm; 2) the data of the managerial own-
ership in this research is more dominant zero 
sums that causes the data is not normal. 
This study has some suggestions for the 
next study. 1) The next study should better 
use the longer observed period so that it can 
yield better results. It is with the observed 
period such as only one year; 2) the re-
searchers can replace the financing decision 
as moderating variable that can strengthen or 
weaken the managerial ownership in influ-
encing the value of the firm; 3) they should 
also better add the financing decision ratio 
as a independent variable and the independ-
ent variable other than managerial owner-
ship, and extend the samples with considera-
tion of the sample criteria established previ-
ously. 
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